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RESURRECTION FROM BABEL: THE CULTURAL, POLITICAL,
AND LEGAL STATUS OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN
LEBANON AND SYRIA AND THEIR PROSPECTS
FOR THE FUTURE
Alexandra R. Harrington t
I. INTRODUCTION
In a well-known Biblical story, the faithful attempted to create a
place of unity for themselves and set about building the Tower of Babel,
only to see the Tower implode due to linguistic differences and power
assertions. The end result of efforts based in faith and mutual belief was
utter destruction of the shared dream and goal, and all of those involved in
the attempt to build the Tower were relegated to the same failure despite
2their best intentions and communal support.
Thousands of years later, the world is still plagued by sectarian strife
and warfare. Indeed, the situation has only become more involved since
Babel, as there are now inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts for
supremacy and superiority. A notable difference in these conflicts is that
t J.D. 2005, Albany Law School of Union University; B.A. Politics, B.A. History 2002,
New York University. The author wishes to thank her parents for their advice and
encouragement, and particularly her mother for handing down a love of her heritage and
her willingness to read about it. She also wishes to thank John Harrington, long-suffering
and perpetual reader, Onchan, Professor Sandra Stevenson, Professor Connie Mayer, and
her family and friends for their support. This article is dedicated to the memory of the
author's grandparents, Norman Mokhiber and Marion Devlin Mokhiber, and aunt, Kathy
Mokhiber. The author welcomes comments regarding this article via e-mail to
arharrington@gmail.com.
1. Genesis 11.
2. Id.
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the ultimate tool of getting to Heaven is no longer a tower, it is now a
state. Within the framework of the much-vaunted and highly-contested
state structure, which sits at the heart of inter-communal and intra-
communal conflicts, lays a duality of politics and law. A state cannot exist
without political actors, whatever their motivations may be, and political
actors of all belief systems have embraced the need for laws as a method of
control - if not equality and a means of assuring an open society.
For Christian communities in the Middle East there is perhaps no
greater a living symbol of the effects of Babel-esque intra-communal
fighting than Lebanon. The fighting between Christian communities in
Lebanon,3 and the alliances of these communities with various MuslimS•4
communities and other nations trying to crush rival Christian opposition,
is more than just a memory of decades past; it continues today, albeit in
slightly less violent forms than during the civil war which ravaged the
country for over a decade.5 By contrast, the political and legal standing of
Christian communities across the border in Syria is nowhere near as
visible, or publicized as their Lebanese co-religionists.' However, lack of
visibility does not correlate to lack of existence, and indeed there are many
historical Christian communities within Syria.7 Disturbingly, at a time
when many see the Middle East as an area that is unquestionably Muslim
in character, and when Arab scholars themselves write on the topic of
8creating a symbiosis between democracy and Islam while ignoring the
existence of other salient groups in the democratic debate,9 Christian
communities in Lebanon and Syria appear to be phased out of public
discourse. There is perhaps no more vital a time for these communities to
come to the forefront of the political and legal lives of their nations than at
3. See discussion infra Parts II.A., II.B.
4. See discussion infra Parts II.A., II.B.
5. See discussion infra Parts II.D., III.D.
6. See discussion infra Part III.A.
7. See discussion infra Part III.A.
8. See, e.g., FAWAZ GERGES, AMERICA AND POLITICAL ISLAM: CLASH OF CULTURES OR
CLASH OF INTERESTS (1999) (explaining differences in American and Middle Eastern
foreign policy stances as, in part, the result of failures of American officials to seek
understanding of political Islam); LARIBI SADIKI, THE SEARCH FOR ARAB DEMOCRACY:
DISCOURSES AND COUNTER-DISCOURSES (2004) (concluding that both democracy and
Islam must alter elements of their fundamental parameters in order to allow for democratic
Middle Eastern states).
9. See generally SADIKI, supra note 8 (emphasizing that Islamic governments will be the
continued trend in the Middle East and failing to address the impact of non-Muslims on the
advent of democratic regimes in the Middle East).
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the present, as the future composition of the Middle East lies in the
balance, and with it the future rights of these communities.
Part II of this article will discuss the Lebanese situation.0 This part
starts with a description of the Christian communities in Lebanon,
including their relationships with larger churches throughout the world.
Discussion then turns to the political history of Lebanon since the nation's
founding, with the promulgation of its constitution in 1926,12 which
necessarily includes the Christian communities." Emphasis will be placed
on the intra-communal relationships during the last civil war (1975-1991) 14
and its aftermath, 5 as well as the growth of Islamist groups in Lebanon and
their effect on the global perception of Lebanon as a political actor. 6
After this historical discussion, the article will present the Lebanese
constitutional law, as well as statutory law in the form of electoral law,
personal status law, property law, and criminal law. 7 These laws will be
analyzed in terms of their plain language meanings and practical
implications in a country that has varied widely from the tenets of the rule
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. There are some conflicting opinions as to the precise dates of the Lebanese civil war.
For simplicity, and because it represents an outside opinion and is less open to charges of
domestic Lebanese political influence, the author uses the dates provided by the C.I.A. and
U.S. Department of State for the civil war. See LEBANON FAcTBOOK,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005)
[hereinafter LEBANON FAcrBOOK]; Background Note: Lebanon, U.S. Department of State
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter
Background Note: Lebanon].
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C. The author has selected these areas of law for analysis
because it is her belief that constitutional law tenets - such as equality of all persons before
the law and the ability of people to own property without interference from the
government (in the absence of a legitimate exercise of eminent domain) - are hollow if they
are only codified in a constitutional document and are not made a valid and enforceable
part of the laws which enshrine the daily rights and practices of a nation's population. Not
only does the author believe that equality in areas of personal status and property
ownership are necessary to legitimate a constitution, she believes and will argue in Parts II,
III, and IV that the ownership right in one's status and one's property is an essential way to
link any person/population to the nation in which he resides and create ownership of that
nation's laws and future. As will be seen throughout this article, the author advocates for
legal changes and protections primarily in the form of statutory laws to accompany already
existing constitutional law provisions in Lebanon and Syria based on her belief in the need
for constitutional and statutory law to mirror each other rather than excuse each other.
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of law and the guarantees enshrined in its constitution, despite having had
18
a continual constitutional apparatus since 1926. Part II will close with the
author's call for unity among Lebanese Christian communities as a way to
ensure political stability,'9 enshrine legal rights for Christians in Lebanon,
which do not mirror those applied to Christians in other Muslim
communities (or the dhimmi patterns used in the Ottoman Empire), 20 and
give Lebanese Christians a greater role in the control of their country.21 It
will be argued that these suggestions will not only strengthen the Christian
communities, and Lebanon itself, but will also strengthen Lebanese
Muslim communities that are currently facing an uneasy choice between
terrorist group affiliation and a peaceful civil society.22 Unity among
Lebanon's Christian communities will also invite confidence from the
United States and its allies in the global war on terror, which would serve
to bolster the ability of the Lebanese state to be a reliable and functional
ally, rather than a Syrian pawn."
24Part III of this article will discuss the Syrian situation. The
available information on Christian communities in Syria is not on par with
the information available about the Lebanese Christian communities,
hence the initial background discussion of the Syrian Christian
communities will be brief." Part III will turn from the Syrian Christian
communities themselves to the history of Syria since its independence in
261926, with an emphasis on its cross-border role in Lebanon. A discussion
of Syrian constitutional law, as well as statutory law in the form of election
law, personal status law, and the effect of decades old emergency law will
27then ensue. As in Part II, the legal analysis will emphasize the real,pragmatic state of Syrian law rather than the esoteric or plain meaning of
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.
19. See discussion infra Part II.D.
20. See Fuad I. Khuri, The Alawis of Syria: Religious Ideology and Organization in
SYRIA: SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND POLITY 49 (Richard T. Antoun and Donald Quataert eds.,
1991); see generally ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 220, 242 (1991);
Sergei Hackel, The Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY 564 (John McManners ed., 2002).
21. See discussion infra Part II.D.
22. See discussion infra Part IID.
23. See discussion infra Part II.D.
24. See discussion infra Part Il.
25. See discussion infra Part III.A.
26. See discussion infra Part III.B.
27. See discussion infra Part III.C. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text
(stating the author's reasoning in selecting these areas of law for discussion and analysis).
220 [Vol. 13:2
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the Syrian Constitution. The conclusion of Part III will be the author's
call for Syrian Christians - those in Syria and those who have emigrated -
along with Lebanese Christians to use the increasingly dire situation of the
Assad regime in Syria to push for legal reform for Syrian Christians and
Syrians as a whole.29  This call comes with the caveat that domestic
agitation might be too risky to attempt at present,30 but will highlight that if
Lebanese Christian communities were to follow the author's
recommendations in Part II, the situation and bargaining power of Syrian
Christians would likely increase as a result."
Finally, Part IV will summarize the conclusions and
recommendations in Parts II and III for Lebanon and Syria.32 Part IV will
emphasize that from the pieces of Christian communities in Lebanon and
Syria which have been ravaged by both internal and external forces, it is
possible to resurrect the modern Babel and fashion, if not a tower to
Heaven, at the very least two states which celebrate their shared faiths
rather than their devastating divisions.33
II. LEBANON
A. Christian Communities in Lebanon
The officially recognized Christian communities in Lebanon include
the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Catholics,
Roman Catholics, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian
Orthodox, Orthodox Melkites, and forms of Protestantism. 34  These
communities have a long history with Lebanon,35 and were part of the
Ottoman governing system of allowing millets - groups of non-Islamic, or
non-Arabic as the case might be, peoples - to live within the confines of
28. See discussion infra Part III.C.
29. See discussion infra Part III.D.
30. See discussion infra Part III.D.
31. See discussion infra Part III.D.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
34. See Joseph Chamie, Religious Groups in Lebanon: A Descriptive Investigation, 11(2)
INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 175, 176 (1980) (describing the forms of recognized
religious groups in Lebanon); see also Fr. Nasser Gemayel, The Christian Communities in
Lebanon (Nayla H. Mouzannar trans.), at
http://www.opuslibani.org.lb/Lebanon/dos003.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
35. Gemayel, supra note 34; Kallistos Ware, Eastern Christendom in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY (John McManners ed., 1993); Jeremy Johns, Christianity and
Islam in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY (John McManners ed., 2002); CHARLES
WINSLOW, LEBANON: WAR AND POLITICS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY, 11, 66 (1996).
2006]
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the Ottoman Empire in exchange for a lower social status and payments
from the millet leaders to the Ottoman regime.36 As fellow believers in
God and "the book," Christian communities were also protected by the
Ottomans because of their status as dhimmi - believers who did not
convert to Islam but nevertheless worshiped God and a holy book. 7
Throughout the growth and development of Mount Lebanon,
Beirut, and the areas which comprise modern-day Lebanon, the Maronites
and the Greek Orthodox became the paramount groups in the Christian
power structure;as the Maronites came to control the Mountain, a9 and the
Greek Orthodox extended more control over Beirut.40 Politically, these
groups have stood the test of time and continue to be the most influential
Christian communities in Lebanon, 4' although in the author's opinion, all
of the Christian communities have gained in status - extant or potential -
in the wake of the civil war and the current war on terrorism taking place
in the Middle East. This is because many of the traditional leaders in the
Maronite community in particular were killed or forced into exile by the
civil war," and recent polling data indicates that many of the remaining
Christian political leaders in general are tainted in the eyes of Lebanese
Christians, because of their dependence upon and affiliation with Syria.43
36. See Johns, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. See MICHAEL JOHNSON, ALL HONOURABLE MEN: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF WAR IN
LEBANON 2 (2001).
39. See id.; SAMIR KHALAF, CIVIL AND UNCIVIL VIOLENCE IN LEBANON: A HISTORY OF
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN CONTACT 281 (2002). "In a sense, the Maronites
never ceased to recognize Mount Lebanon as their national home." Id.
40. See Chamie, supra note 34, at 180 (describing the results of a 1970 Lebanese study
finding that "the percentage of all Catholics (mainly Maronites) who are located in Mount
Lebanon and Beirut is 38 and 37 percent, respectively."); see generally KHALAF, supra note
39, at 281 (setting out the dichotomy between the worldview of the Maronites in the
mountain and the Greek Orthodox and other communities which had established
themselves in various Lebanese cities).
41. See generally Chamie, supra note 34; JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 2.
42. See KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54 (2002) ("While all other communities appear to
enjoy uncontested leaders or spokesmen, the Maronites seem leaderless, splintered and
bereft of compelling voices apart perhaps from the Patriarch."); Simon Haddad, The
Christians of Lebanon in the Context of a Syrian-Israeli Political Relations, 26(3) J. OF SOC.
POL. & ECON. STUD. 589 (2001) (recounting polling results in which many Lebanese
Christians reported that they were not pleased with the political leaders who had survived
the civil war and remain active in Lebanese politics).
43. Haddad, supra note 42, at 601 (explaining that most powerful Christian politicians
are tainted by their affiliations with Syria and stating that "[n]early 84% of the respondents
[who were all Lebanese Christians] do not feel that their ruling elites work in the best
interest of the people."); see also id. at 602-03 (stating that, although disenchantment with
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In this situation, it is politically feasible that a member of any Christian
community, with the right grass-roots support and personality, could
emerge as a future leader of a block of united Lebanese Christian
communities, provided that the political and legal reality of the need for
unity is understood and achieved. 44 After all, the presence of Maronites
and other Christian groups in Lebanon has historically been such that, at
its founding, many Lebanese considered the nation to be rightfully
Christian.
To understand how this unity is possible in terms of beliefs as well as
pragmatic politics, it is important to examine briefly the doctrinal beliefs of
several Christian groups and their historical places in Lebanon.
1. The Maronites
Founded as a separate religious group, the Maronites are currently
one of the many Uniate Churches affiliated with Roman Catholicism
through a sworn allegiance to the Pope.46 Maronites have claimed shelter
in Mount Lebanon for well over a thousand years, were involved in the
Crusades at various points in time,47 and were rewarded with the 1584
founding of the Maronite College in Rome.48 The Maronite College still
and distrust of the Lebanese government and the individuals who comprise it is prevalent
among all religious communities, it is most prevalent among Lebanese Christians per se).
44. See KHALAF, supra note 39, at 27 (discussing the increasing trend of confessional
identification among Lebanese today).
[M]ore and more Lebanese are today brandishing their confessionalism, if we may invoke a
dual metaphor, as both emblem and armor: Emblem, because confessional identity has
become the most viable medium for asserting presence and securing vital needs and
benefits... Armor, because it has become a shield against real or imagined threats. The
more vulnerable the emblem, the thicker the armor.
Id.; see also Ahmad Beydoun, Confessionalism: Outline of an Announced Reform in
OPTIONS FOR LEBANON 75, 85-87 (Nawaf Salam ed., 2004) (describing the effect of the civil
war on self-identification with a confessional community in Lebanon). It is the author's
opinion that this trend will only continue in the face of increased instability in the Middle
East generally, and particularly in light of the Hariri investigation and the steadily more
public debate over the appropriate role of Syria in Lebanese political life.
45. See Rania Maktabi, The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?,
26(2) BRIT. J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 219, 224 n.9 (1999); WINSLOW, supra note 35, at
64-70 (describing the motivations of early Lebanese Republic founders videlicet religion
and the state).
46. Gemayel, supra note 34.
47. Id. Interestingly, some of the Muslim civil war opponents of the Maronites in
particular referred to them as "crusaders." See generally Johns, supra note 35.
48. Gemayel, supra note 34; HOURANI, supra note 20, at 242.
2006]
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exists today,49 as does the role of the Maronite clergy as religious and
political leaders within Lebanon. °
With historical longevity on its side, the Maronite Church in
Lebanon has continued to be a political force. 1 Maronites were vehement
that Lebanon be founded on the principle of having a Christian majority
after independence was achieved in 1943.52 However, at the time of the
creation of the Lebanese Constitution, which was in essence the founding
of the modern Lebanese Republic, and in the years afterward when
citizenship and voting rights became paramount issues in the political and
legal power structure of Lebanon, the Maronites and other Christian
communities took a pragmatic view of the need to buffer the Christian
communities as a whole, consenting to the extension of citizenship rights to
members of other Christian communities who had emigrated 3
Due to the potential contentiousness that a religion-based census
could bring to Lebanon, an official census has not been released since the
1932 census which was used to create the legislative apportionment scheme
of seats as 6 Christian seats for every 5 Muslim seats in the Lebanese
Parliament 4  However, the total estimated Christian population in
Lebanon is approximately 1.48 million, representing the estimate that
Christians comprise approximately 39% of the Lebanese population as of
mid-2005.55 In this context, it is important to note the toll that the 1975-
1991 civil war took on the Christian communities in Lebanon as a whole.
It has been estimated that roughly 950,000 people fled Lebanon during the
16decades of the war, approximately two-thirds of whom were Christians.
49. Gemayel, supra note 34.
50. WALID KHALIDI, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN LEBANON: CONFRONTATION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 68-72 (1979).
51. See Maktabi, supra note 45, at 227; WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 67; Background
Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
52. See Maktabi, supra note 45.
53. Id.
54. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14. This apportionment system, as well
as the confessional apportionment system used for the top governmental positions in
Lebanon, was part of the National Pact, an unwritten agreement which was in effect until
the end of the civil war. Id.
55. See Maktabi, supra note 45; LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14; Background Note:
Lebanon, supra note 14. It is important to remember that the population percentages do
not necessarily correspond to citizenship status and voting rights figures, as Palestinian
refugees who can be counted as Lebanese inhabitants are not granted citizenship rights and
cannot vote in Lebanon. See id.; see also Haddad, supra note 42 (describing the position of
Palestinians in Lebanese society and their relationship with Lebanese Christians).
56. M. Joseph Khoreich, Results of the Lebanese War 1975-1997, Centre Catholique
d'Information (Dr. Georges Kallas trans.), at
[Vol. 13:2
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It is also estimated that roughly two-thirds of the Lebanese who fled
during the civil war and have chosen not to return to Lebanon to date are
Christians of some denomination.57 All Christian denominations in
Lebanon are, or have been active in the propagation of religious orders in
Lebanon, and/or the maintenance of hospitals, schools, and charitable
institutions.5 8 Many of these institutions, especially schools, were damaged
or destroyed in the war.59 Yet, they still carry on today as integral parts of
the community. Indeed, with the exception of the American University of
Beirut,60 the best known universities in Lebanon are at least affiliated with
61Christianity.
Due to their preeminent status among the Lebanese Christian
communities, the Maronites have enjoyed the guarantee that the President
of Lebanon will always be a Maronite. 62 The only other groups so
privileged are the Sunnis, who are guaranteed the Prime Minister's spot in
any Lebanese government, and the Shi'is, who are guaranteed the slot of
the President of the Lebanese Parliament.63
During the civil war, by far the greatest number of Christian
combatant groups were Maronites; 64 indeed, although the Lebanese
national Kata'ib party was founded on the idea of a Christian state in
Lebanon,65 it ultimately eschewed a Maronite identity and became
associated with the Maronite-dominated Phalanges party and its militant
http://www.opuslibani.org.lb/lebanon/dos013.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006); see also
TouFIC K. GASPARD, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEBANON, 1948 - 2002: THE LIMITS OF
LAISSEZ-FAIRE 97 (2004)(providing non-religiously based emigration figures for Lebanon
from 1900 to 1974; these figures show an upswing in emigration starting from the 1970 -
1974 period).
57. Khoreich, supra note 56.
58. KHALAF, supra note 39, at 281 (providing a brief account of the role of Christian
religious orders in the early founding of Lebanese educational institutions).
59. See Khoreich, supra note 56.
60. The American University of Beirut is administered under the auspices of the State
University of New York. See About the University, American University of Beirut,
http://www.aub.edu.lb/about/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
61. See GASPARD, supra note 56, at 46 (describing the founding of several influential
religious-based universities in Lebanon, especially at the behest of the Jesuits and
Lazarists).
62. This is one of the provisions of the National Pact which remains in effect today. See
Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
63. Id.
64. WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 192-93; JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 36-37.
65. WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 193-94; JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 36-37, 150-51.
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66groups. While the civil war raged, so too did the internal divisions within
the Maronite community, particularly within the groups established by
former notable Maronite families.67 Ultimately, these divisions would
provide an opening for both Syria and Israel to enter the conflict and add
681their own agendas to the war and the peace which followed.
Despite the ravages of war, the Maronites have managed to
maintain their permanent hold on the Presidency, and have also
maintained the majority apportionment of Christian seats in the Lebanese
Parliament, even after the Ta'if Agreement (officially known as the
Charter of Lebanese National Reconciliation)69 altered the apportionment
of seats in the Parliament so that there would be absolute parity between
Christians and Muslims.7° However, neither the Ta'if provisions nor the
constitutional enshrinement of religion-based awarding of key
governmental posts has been enough to stop violence carried out against
Christian targets and in Christian neighborhoods, most recently in the
form of bombings.7
2. The Greek Orthodox
The Greek Orthodox Church in Lebanon traces its origins to the
• • 72
early years of Christianity. As a separate entity from Roman
Catholicism, and not part of the Uniate Churches, the Greek Orthodox
66. WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 193-94; KHALAF, supra note 39, at 230 (describing the
escalation of Maronite, and particularly Kata'ib, militarization and mobilization in the face
of the initial events which ultimately lead to the civil war); Id. at 241 (describing the various
combination of sectarian allies and enemies during the course of the civil war).
67. WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 193-94; Id. at 221-30; KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 68-72
(1979); EYAL ZISSER, LEBANON: THE CHALLENGE OF INDEPENDENCE 10-12, 17-21 (2000)
[hereinafter ZISSER LEBANON].
68. See WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 199-200, 218-24; KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 139-43
(describing the process in which escalating hostilities between Syria and Israel were played
out through the actions of these countries, and their designated agents, in Lebanon).
69. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
70. KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54 (describing the impact of this parity on the psyche of
the Christian and Muslim communities). Currently, Maronites hold 34 of the 128 seats in
Parliament. See Loi Electoral Parlementaire, Tableau 1 - Les Sieges Parlementaire Dans
Les Circonscriptions Electorale (Electoral law, Table 1 - parliamentary seats in the
electoral districts), Republique Libanaise Assemblee Nationale, available at
http://www.lp.gov.lb/Version%20Francaise/Loi/tablel.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter Loi ELECTORAL PARLEMENTAIRE].
71. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 246-49 (describing Syrian attempts to intimidate
non-cooperative groups in Lebanon in the aftermath of Syrian attempts to increase local
and national control from 2000 onward).
72. It should be remembered that the Orthodox Church per se did not exist until
Christianity was well established in the Middle East.
[Vol. 13:2
RESURRECTION FROM BABEL
population is not affiliated with the Vatican, although recent popes and
patriarchs have made overtures that indicate all sides are willing to attempt
to breach the schism, which divided the churches initially." While the
Maronites primarily gathered on Mount Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox
became increasingly urban, especially during the nineteenth-century, when
many Greek Orthodox became traders, merchants and bankers.74
As mentioned above, the Greek Orthodox represent the second
largest Christian community in Lebanon, and have historically held this
position.75 There are no governmental positions guaranteed to the Greek
Orthodox community under the National Pact,76 although the community
has been apportioned fourteen seats in the Lebanese Parliament since the
Ta'if Agreement.77  Despite the lack of a guarantee to hold certain
positions, the Greek Orthodox clergy and leadership still wield
tremendous influence within the community.
78
In the civil war years, the Christian communities in Lebanon fought
not only within their own sects, but also with their co-religionists.
Maronites and Greek Orthodox fought each other,79 as well as other
Christians and Muslims,s° in a war which, although began as a religious war
in name, ultimately blurred confessionalism with pragmatic alliances, and
in the process undermined the cohesion of the Lebanese Christian
communities. This was dangerous enough for Lebanese Christians;
however, media coverage of the war, which tended to portray the conflict
73. See Catholics, Orthodox Trying to Mend Rift, THE BROCKVILLE RECORDER AND
TIMES (ONTARIO), Oct. 29, 2005, at A9; Nicole Winfield, Vatican Seeks Full Diplomatic Ties
with Russia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 27, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-10-27-vaticanrussia-x.htm?csp=36.
74. ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 61.
75. Id. at 8-9.
76. See id. at 60-61; see Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
77. Loi Electoral Parlementaire, supra note 70; see also Background Note: Lebanon,
supra note 14.
78. See Haddad, supra note 42 (describing the anti-Syrian actions of the Greek
Orthodox Archbishop Elias Audi during a period of anti-Syrian agitation in 2000;
Archbishop Audi went so far as to use a Palm Sunday homily to deliver a message of
support for anti-Syrian activists).
79. See KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 75-78 (describing the range of political groupings
adopted by the Greek Orthodox and other Christian communities during the civil war,
including those which openly opposed Maronite and Muslim hegemony in Lebanon);
JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 150-51, 160-61; ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 177-86
(providing background on the tensions between factions of the Maronite and Greek
Orthodox communities as they emerged in the founding of the Syrian Nationalist Party (or
PPS) in Lebanon by, among others, a Lebanese Greek Orthodox).
80. KHALIDI, supra note 50, at 75.
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as between Muslims and Christians, or Israelis and Arabs, created and
perpetuated an understanding of the politics of the region which is
oversimplified, easily manipulated, and continues with the present-day
media and international societal understandings.
3. Other Christian Communities
With the exception of the Protestant groups represented in
Lebanon, the remaining Christian communities are either part of theS• 81
Uniate church umbrella, linking them to Roman Catholicism, Roman
Catholic themselves,82 or various forms of Orthodox churches. 83 Although
these communities do not have the numerical strength of the Maronites or
Greek Orthodox, 84 they nevertheless have long standing historical ties to
Lebanon, and are an integral part of Lebanese society.
These communities were involved in, and damaged by the civil war;
indeed it can be argued that the damage sustained by these communities
was perhaps more severe than the majority communities. However, the
plight of the majority communities was misidentified as the plight of
"Christians" or "Arabs" in general, and was more visible to the world. In
an electoral sense, these communities have regained at least some measure
of status under the current Christian Parliamentary apportionment
system.85
B. Lebanese Creation and Strife
Lebanon's status changed dramatically in the early twentieth
century, starting out as part of the rapidly declining Ottoman Empire, then
becoming a French mandate after the cessation of World War I,
promulgating a constitution in 1926, and eventually achieving its own
86independence in 1943. When Lebanon was created, it was an enigma, the
first Christian-associated nation in the Middle East at the time. Although
known for its confessional status, the original Lebanese Constitution
81. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Although there are no official census figures available, a rough estimate of the
populations of these groups can be inferred from the number of Parliamentary seats
apportioned to each group. See Loi Electoral Parlementaire, supra note 70. At present,
excluding Maronite and Greek Orthodox seats, there are 15 "other" Christian seats in the
Lebanese Parliament. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
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eschewed confessionalism, declaring that there would be religious freedom
and tolerance for all.87
Like most enigmas, particularly those dependent on politics and law
to perpetuate their status, Lebanon's myth was soon subsumed by the
reality of inter-confessional divisions which threatened the future of the
young nation. In 1943, these divisions resulted in the National Pact - an
unwritten agreement between various powerful political leaders of
religious communities - that created the 6 Christian and 5 Muslim
Parliamentary seat apportionment system, which would remain in effect
until the Ta'if Agreement. 88 The National Pact also enshrined the
permanent assignment of the Presidency of the Lebanese Republic to a
Maronite, the position of Prime Minister to a Sunni, and the President of
the Lebanese Parliament to a Shi'ia.89
The reasons asserted for the increasing tensions in Lebanon in the
years from the creation of the National Pact through the next incidence of
civil strife in 1958,90 and culminating in the civil war are numerous: the
increasing influence of Israel and Palestinian refugees who relocated to
Lebanon;91 the rising influence of Syria in Lebanon's domestic politics and
in the international world;92 the increasing number of Muslims in the
country, coupled with Lebanon's status as the only Christian country in the
otherwise Muslim Middle East;93 the changing social and economic milieu
of the country;94 the difficulties in trying to establish a pan-Arab culture
with sectarian differences;95 the list goes on. Although these explanations
may seemingly confuse the understanding of the situation, the disconnect
between the laws and principles enshrined in legal documents and
87. The current Lebanese constitution still retains these protections. See discussion infra
Part II.C (discussing Lebanese constitutional and statutory law, with emphasis on personal
status law).
88. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; see generally ZISSER LEBANON, supra
note 67, at 60-67.
89. ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 58.
90. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
91. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 42.
92. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
93. See, e.g., id.
94. See generally GASPARD, supra note 56 (discussing the changing economic situation in
Lebanon from independence onwards, and the impact of this change on the social makeup
of the Lebanese).
95. See generally ZISSER LEBANON, supra note 67, at 164-89 (discussing the PPS); see
discussion infra Part III (discussing the rise of the Ba'athist movement in Syria and its
goals).
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discourse and the meaning of these laws and principles in reality becomes
vividly real.
This disconnect reached new heights during the civil war,96 when law
as such was ineffective, and even customary communal laws - such as
respect for notable families,97 respect for elders and women,98 and the
observance of standard social tenets grounded in religious teachings, i.e.
that killing is illegal and against God's commandments99 - were cast aside
in an escalating cycle of violence and hatred. 1' ° The disconnect was thus
nearly complete.
Once peace arrived through the Ta'if Agreement,101 which is widely
held to be a compromise document created at the behest of foreign
• 102
governments, particularly Syria, the words of law were again meant to
solidify the Lebanese state, though this time at the cost of significant
legislative powers for the Christian communities as a whole.
C. Lebanese Constitutional and Statutory Law
1. Lebanese Constitutional Law
The original Lebanese Constitution was promulgated in 1926,1°' andhas been amended on multiple occasions.1°4 In the aftermath of the civil
96. A discussion of the causes of the Lebanese civil war is outside the scope of this
article, and indeed this has been the subject of many books and articles. See generally
JOHNSON, supra note 38; KHALAF, supra note 39; Background Note: Lebanon, supra note
14, LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
97. For a discussion of the splits between Christian groups, which evinced a disregard for
the established leadership and primacy of notables, see supra discussion Part II.A.
98. For an account of the horrific and ritualistic violence carried out against women,
children, and the elderly by all sides during the war, see generally JOHNSON, supra note 38
(positing that these crimes were perpetrated because of the role that women in particular
served in all religious groups within Lebanese society, namely that of the repository of the
male community's honor).
99. This is perhaps the most elemental of the Ten Commandments and also carries over
into Islam, regardless of the legal penalties placed on killing by a statutory law-based
society.
100. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 38 (accounting the escalating brutalities
committed during the war); see also Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
101. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; see also KHALAF, supra note 39, at
54.
102. See KHALAF, supra note 39, at 54 (detailing the Ta'if Agreement's requirement that
Syrian troops be stationed in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Agreement's implementation
and a later interpretation of the Agreement to allow for the presence of Syrian troops in
Lebanon until certain milestones in Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli relations are met).
103. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
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war, a new constitutional preamble was inserted, providing in relevant part
that: Lebanon is "sovereign, free, and independent," for the benefit of all
of its "children," inside the borders recognized by the international
community; Lebanon is Arab in its identity; the Lebanese economic
system is open and guarantees individual rights and private property; and
that "[t]he suppression of confessionalism [in politics] constitutes a
national goal essential practice for the nation."' 05 Title one, chapter two of
the, constitution provides that all Lebanese are to be considered for public
employment without regard to factors other than their individual merit
and qualifications, as well as other factors dictated by law.106 Chapter two
also protects private property from a governmental taking without reasonS 107
and compensation.
Contrary to the goals of the preamble, title two, chapter two
provides that apportionment for parliamentary seats is to be made initially
on an equal division between Christians and Muslims,09 with these seats
subdivided by region1°9 and by sect within each religion and region.110
Currently, the Lebanese Parliament is comprised of 128 seats,' of which
64 are designated as Christian seats and 64 as Muslim seats. Interestingly,
despite the apportionment system used, the constitution goes on to state
that each Member of Parliament ("MP") is a member for the nation rather
than his own constituency, and must act accordingly in performing the
duties of his office. n2
The President of Lebanon is largely a figurehead under
constitutional law, albeit it a confessionally selected figurehead. His
powers as commander-in-chief are subsumed by the powers of the Council
of Ministers,1 and technically his term is limited to one consecutive
104. Summaries of past amendments to the Lebanese constitution are available from the
Lebanese Parliament. See LA CONSTITUTION LIBANAISE, Republique Libanaise Assemblee
Nationale, available at http://www.lp.gov.lblVersion%20Francaise/constitution.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2005).
105. LEBANON [Constitution] pmbl., available at
http://www.lp.gov.lbNersion%20Francaise/constitution/menu-esp.htm#lst (last visited
Feb. 26, 2006).
106. Id. at tit.1, ch. 2, art. 12.
107. Id. at art. 15.
108. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at tit. 2, ch. 2, art. 24 (a).
109. Id. at art. 24(c).
110. Id. at art. 24(b).
111. LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
112. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at tit. 2 , ch. 3, art. 27.
113. Id.
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114term, although past and present attempts to thwart this provision have
been made."5 The President signs laws into effect, although he does not
possess the ability to change laws promulgated by Parliament; in terms of
foreign policy, both the President and the Prime Minister must sign
treaties into law for them to be legally binding."' The Prime Minister is
named by the President with the consent of Parliament. i The primary
executive function of the Lebanese government is carried out by the
Council of Ministers, which is comprised of MPs elevated to ministerial
status.11 9
2. Statutory Law
a. Electoral Laws
Electoral laws are the backbone to free participation in government
and an open society. In Lebanon, all Lebanese who are age 21 or over are
given the right to vote, as long as they are not subject to a legal penalty20
(i.e. deprivation of rights as punishment m or an established state of mental
insanity122 ) and are not part of the military or any other national policing
body. 23  Eligible voters are registered to vote in their assigned
124geographical electoral districts by religious sect, and must identify
themselves by name, address, and religion when going to the polls to
114. Id.; see also Jean Naffah, Administrative Law in THE LEnANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I
60 (Antoine El-Gemayel ed., 1985).
115. Most recently, controversy over extending the presidency of Emile LaHoud for a
second term caused a rift between the Syrian regime and Lebanese leaders, key among then
former Prime Minister Rafiki Hariri. According to press accounts at the time, and the
preliminary findings of the U.N. committee charged with investigating Mr. Hariri's murder
on February 14, 2005, this rift with Syria resulted in hostile confrontations between Syria
and several Lebanese regime members, as well as Mr. Hariri's assassination by car bomb in
the streets of Beirut. At present, as the result of the 2004 decision by the Lebanese
Parliament, Mr. LaHoud still retains the office of President of the Republic of Lebanon.
LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14.
116. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at tit. 2, ch. 4, art 51.
117. Id. at art. 51.
118. Id. at art. 53.
119. Id. at art. 65.
120. Loi Electoral Parlimentaire, ch. 2 art. 9 (2005), available at
http://www.lp.gov.lbNersion%20Francaise/Loi/menu.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
121. Id. at arts. 9, 10 (the most common cause of legal deprivation of the franchise is the
violation of the Lebanese Criminal Code provisions).
122. Id. at art. 9.
123. Id. at ch. 4, art. 28.
124. Id. at ch. 1, art. 4.
RESURRECTION FROM BABEL
vote. 12' There are established mechanisms of governmental oversight of
persons who are on voting lists and their status as eligible voters, and these
lists must be compared prior to any election.2 6
b. Personal Status Laws
Under the terms of the Lebanese Constitution, all Lebanese are
"children" of the nation and enjoy the same rights, regardless of
confession. 12' However, the Lebanese personal status laws illustrate a
disconnect between constitutional imperatives and the reality of law and
society in Lebanon. Secular courts in Lebanon, 12s which are tasked with
certain limited functions, many of these having to do with governmental
and constitutional oversight, figure heavily in Lebanese jurisprudence.129 It
is important to note that religious communities form their own councils
and governmental bodies for their communities in addition to
administering religious courts.3
Religious courts in Lebanon are barred from trying cases brought
131pursuant to Lebanese penal laws, as well as certain civil cases. While it is
possible for a person to change his religious sect, religious courts assume
they have jurisdiction over a person if they have jurisdiction over the
person's father by virtue of his religious affiliation. 112 If the father changes
his religious affiliation and his child has yet to reach the legal age of
majority, the father's new religion has jurisdiction over both the father and
113his children. In cases where the litigants belong to different religions,jurisdiction shifts to secular courts 34
125. Id. at ch. 3, art. 13.
126. Loi Electoral Parlimentaire, supra note 120, at ch. 3, arts. 17-27 (2005).
127. LEBANON [Constitution], supra note 105, at pmbl.
128. The jurisdiction of secular courts in Lebanon is further subdivided into criminal and
civil jurisdiction generally, with separate, secular military courts existing for limited
questions of military law as well. See JUDICIARY: LEBANON, United Nations Development
Programme, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/judiciary.asp?cid=9 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
129. See Suleiman Takieddine, An Independent Judiciary for a Better Justice in OPTIONS
FOR LEBANON 23, 30-34 (Nawaf Salam ed., 2004) (describing the divisions within the
secular court structure in Lebanon).
130. Bachir Bilani, Ibrahim Najjar & Antoine El-Gemayel, Personal Status in THE
LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I 267 (Antoine El-Gemayel ed., 1985) [hereinafter Personal
Status].
131. Id. at 268.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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One of the primary areas of jurisprudence for religious courts is
marriage, and subsidiary questions arising from marriage-related issues. It
is in these areas that there is a disparity between the laws and
requirements for Christians of various sects, not to mention Jews and
Muslims."' For example, Catholic and Orthodox communities have
slightly different requirements for marital capacity, and their
interpretation of what voids a marriage and the effects of a void marriage
on any children of that marriage differ vastly.'37 Christian communities
also differ in their requirements for establishing valid parentage,
recognition of children, and adoption of children.' Religious status also
impacts the inheritance and gift-giving rights of Lebanese in both life and
death. 39
c. Property Law
Regardless of their religion, land-owning Lebanese are required to
register their land with their local government, 14 subject to an official
assessment of the land by a surveyor.14 All landowners receive the same
rights in and to their property, subject to the general interests of society in
the use of the property and the ability of the government to take the
142property for cause and with compensation to the property owner.
•• 143
Secular Lebanese courts govern disputes regarding land-ownership, and
the ability to use the right of usufruct,'" except to the extent that
inheritance laws are involved.
4 1
135. Id.
136. Personal Status, supra note 130, at 276 (explaining that Catholic courts will find a
lack of capacity when there is some element of "feigning" involved in consent to marry such
as a lack of intent to remain faithful to one's spouse during the marriage or to procreate
during the marriage while "[a]ccording to the Christian Orthodox and Evangelical sects,
coercion or seduction only will nullify consent.").
137. Id. at 276-77, 296-300, 306-12.
138. See id. 321-34.
139. See id. 349-51, 363-77.
140. Edward Eid, Antoine El-Gemayel, Real Property in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM
vol. I 205 (Antoine EI-Gemayel ed., 1985).
141. Id. at 208.
142. Id. at 221-27.
143. Id. at 233-34.
144. Id. at 238-43. This right under Lebanese law is analogous to usufruct in American
law, which is defined as: "[a] right to use another's property for a time without damaging or
diminishing it, although the property might naturally deteriorate over time." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1542 (7th ed. 1999).
145. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
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d. Criminal Law
All Lebanese are subject to the criminal code regardless of their
religious affiliation or status.146  The criminal code makes distinctions
between crimes that qualify as "major offenses" and those which are
essentially misdemeanor offenses. 47 Crimes that are classified as political
are subject to a different set of mens rea requirements and punishment
standards, than those imposed for major offenses and misdemeanors.
Criminal trials start at the lower court level. 149 Their adjudicative results,
but not sentencing, can be appealed up a chain of appellate courts as
applicable,"O except in the case of military court decisions, which have a
separate appellate procedure."' There is a limited right to counsel at
certain points in the adjudicative and questioning process, subject to the
rights of the examining magistrate during the initial investigative
proceeding."'
D. Possibilities for the future
As the previous sections have illustrated, there is a clear disconnect
between constitutional provisions, laws, and societal practices in Lebanon.
The constitution itself decries confessionalism in politics, yet at the same
time enshrines voting procedures that institutionalize religious voting
segregation."' Electoral laws provide the franchise based solely on
citizenship status and capacity. However, voters are registered by religion
114and must identify themselves by such when they vote. Criminal and civil
laws of the Lebanese nation are applied to all Lebanese alike. Yet,
intimate personal legal issues are subject to the requirements of religious
courts and bodies except in rare circumstances which cross the communal
divide.' Lebanese property law provides for equal protections of
landowners regardless of religion, unless it intersects with questions of
116inheritance, which are the province of religious courts. These differences
146. Samir Alyeh, Criminal Law and Procedure in THE LEBANESE LEGAL SYSTEM vol. I
396 (Antoine EI-Gemayel ed., 1985).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 400-01.
150. Id. at 406.
151. Alyeh, supra note 146, at 401.
152. Id. at 404.
153. See discussion supra Part II.C.1, 2.a.
154. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.a.
155. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.d.
156. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
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and contradictions only further serve to divide Lebanese Christian
communities themselves, not to mention Lebanese society as a whole.
There are many historical reasons for the legal divide between
Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon. A call to radically change
this practice is not only unrealistic, but also potentially dangerous given
the presence of Hizbollah"' and other terrorist groups which have used
Lebanese internal weaknesses to create instability in the region in the past
and continue their attempts to do so. However, this is not necessarily
detrimental to the current and future state of Lebanon, and its Christian
and Muslim populations.
At present, there is a divide between nations fighting the war on
terror and Middle Eastern countries, whose response to the war varies
from the more aggressive pursuit of terrorists,159 to countries which are
much more likely to pay lip service to the idea of stopping terrorists than
to take concrete action to stop them.'6° The divide is both political and
cultural, and in many cases is mirrored in the structure of legal, or at least
tacit, legitimization of terror groups in the electoral process. 61 In the
morass of intra-national and inter-Arab debate over terrorism and Islamist
concepts, there are very few state-based ways to offer interested Muslims a
way out of conflict without engendering suspicion from outside forces and
their co-religionists. However, the situation of the Lebanese Christian
communities presents such an opportunity for Muslims, as well as for the
Christian communities themselves.
The legal framework for religious tolerance in Lebanon already
exists. At the same time, there exists a legislative power structure in which
157. See generally Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14 (offering a brief explanation
of the origins of Hizbollah).
158. See LEBANON FAcTBOOK, supra note 14. Hizbollah has become such an entrenched
presence in the Lebanese political sphere that, for the first time, an open member of
Hizbollah was elected to the Parliament and is serving as a minister. See Lebanon Reborn?
Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March
14, 2005: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 3-5 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Tom Lantos) [hereinafter Lebanon Reborn?]. This ministerial
appointment has drawn sharp criticism, especially from the United States, which is unable
to meet with any members of Hizbollah, in accordance with its policies regarding giving
even tacit recognition to terrorist groups. See id. at 8-12 (statement of C. David Welch,
Assistant Sec., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State).
159. Egypt, for example, has been fighting the Muslim Brotherhood for years. See
generally CARRIE ROSEFSKY WICKHAM, MOBILIZING ISLAM: RELIGION, ACTIVISM, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT (2002).
160. See discussion infra Part III (discussing Syria).
161. Egypt is a primary example of this despite its long-time ban on political participation
by the Muslim Brotherhood. See generally WICKHAM, supra note 159.
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Christians could take centralized control of their assigned governmental
segments, as well as the appointment powers given to the President
(provided that the president himself was not a Syrian pawn). Using these
constitutional powers, a united Christian block could start taking
corrective measures to rid Lebanon of Syrian presence, and the presence
of Hizbollah and other such terror groups operating in Lebanon. With the
162attention garnered by the assassination of Rafik Hariri, and the
163
subsequent attempts on the lives of other anti-Syrian voices, Lebanese
Christians and Muslims began vocal protests which resulted in at least the
superficial withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.1 6 The withdrawal,
however, did not remove Syrian influence from Lebanon, and did not
stop terrorist groups from using Lebanon as a training ground and bank
through which to launder illicit funds. Currently, intelligence, military, and
security analysts attest to Lebanon's role in terrorism,6 and members of
162. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14.
163. See id.
164. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 243-49 (detailing recent Syrian actions to manipulate
domestic Lebanese politics from the local level upwards, as well as Lebanese foreign policy
in regards to its relationship with Israel).
165. Anti-Syrian politicians are still targets for assassination plots, which are sometimes
tragically successful. On December 12, 2005, Gibran Tueni, a vocal anti-Syrian Member of
Parliament from the Beirut district who was also a journalist, was killed in a car bombing in
Beirut along with two other people. See Associated Press, Lebanese Journalist Killed in
Motorcade Blast, Dec. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,178404,00.html; Ben Wederman and Anthony Mills,
Lebanon Seeks International Probe into Killings, Dec. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005[WORLD/meast/12/12/lebanon.blast/index.html; L'Assemblee
Nationale Libanese, Liste Des Deputes Par Mohafazat,
http://www.lp.gov.lb/Version%2OFrancaise/deputes.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) (listing
Gibran Tueni as a Member of Parliament). On the same day the U.N. commission
investigating the Hariri assassination presented a report to the Secretary General and the
Security Council which further implicated Syria in Hariri's death. Security Council Receives
Mehlis Report; Annan Condemns New Assassination in Lebanon, UN News Center,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewslD=16905&Cr=middle&Crl=leban (last
visited Feb. 27, 2006).
166. See, e.g., WMD Terrorism and Proliferant States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Dr. Daniel Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security
Studies, Georgetown University Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution); Lebanon Reborn?, supra note 158, at 8-12 (statement of C. David
Welch, Assistant Sec., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State); id. at 14-16
(statement of The Honorable James Kunder, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and
the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development); id. at 37-41 (statement of Paul
Salem, Ph.D., Writer and Analyst, Beirut, Lebanon); Foreign Assistance Oversight: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 33-42 (2005) (statement of
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both parties on Capitol Hill are adopting these views as fact.16' At the
same time, a study of legislative proposals and enactments since
September 11, 2001 indicates that the United States government is
increasingly willing to provide Lebanon with resources to build peaceful
institutions.16 In the days after Hariri's assassination, a bi-partisan chorus
was heard essentially acknowledging that Lebanon is not a willing
participant in Syria's policies and calling for a stronger and independent
Lebanon.
1 69
If the Lebanese Christian communities decided to act as a block,
rather than breaking down along confessional lines, they could elect MPs
who would act in concert. It is the belief of the author that at least some
Sunni members would go along with this to avenge Hariri. Legal
protection of religious beliefs already exists in Lebanese statutory law,7
and the Christian communities would still be able to maintain their ownI- 171
personal status-based courts and councils under such an alliance. The
major change would be a change in mindset from thinking of oneself as a
part of a separate legal enclave within Lebanon to thinking of oneself as a
Honorable David M. Satterfield, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.).
167. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 273, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Con. Res. 32, 109th Cong. (2005);
151 CONG. REc. S4606 (daily ed., Apr. 28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist); 151 CONG. REC.
H1331 (daily ed., Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Rep. Engel).
168. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 35 (2005) (advocating, in a report from the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, extending U.S. aid money to southern Lebanon for the purpose of
assisting in water infrastructural development); H. REP. No. 663 (2002) (advocating, in a
report from the House Comnittee on appropriations, continued funding of religious and
other international organizations working in Lebanon at or above the $35,000,000 level,
which had been previously appropriated). Cf. H. REP. No. 345 (2001) (advocating
extending the bar on sending U.S. funds of any sort to Syria).
169. For an example of pre-Hariri assassination legislation, see Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-175 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
2151 (2004). For some examples of Hariri assassination-based statements, see S. Res. 77,
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 91, 109th Cong. (2005); Exec. Order No. 13,338, 69 Fed. Reg.
26,751 (May 11, 2004) (extended by H.R. Doc. 109-21 (2005)). In this context, it is
important to note that, in addition to Syrian removal from Lebanon, Lebanese Christians
have voiced an overwhelming interest in settling the Lebanese-Israeli dispute and bringing
peace on that front. See Haddad, supra note 42, at 613 ("Lebanese Christian respondents
reveal more than 90% in favor of peace with Israel."). The stated reasons for this desire for
peace are both aspirational and pragmatic, with many Lebanese seeing peace with Israel as
part of the path towards a more stable and prosperous Lebanese economy. See id. at 613-
22 (describing empirical findings regarding Lebanese Christian support for Lebanese-Israeli
peace).
170. See discussion supra Part II.C.
171. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
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Lebanese Christian. The disconnect between constitutional, statutory law
and tradition could, in this instance, be used to give the Christian
communities the strength and reassurance needed to create a power block.
In turn, the author believes that this block would be formidable enough to
encourage further support from the international community, particularly
the United States, and provided that the constitutional and statutory
provisions allowing freedom of religion were not abridged, would pave the
way for a stable and less sectarian Lebanon in the future.
Admittedly, there is a risk that the Christian communities could
attempt to overstep legal boundaries. However, considering the negative
view taken by the international community to more strife in the Middle
East, and the existence of Muslim terrorism groups in Lebanon, to say
nothing of recent memories of wartime atrocities, it is unlikely that such an
usurpation would happen. Assuming that such an usurpation did not
happen, a Christian block would function to offer Lebanese Muslims the
benefit of having an ideology to adhere to, while not having to splinter
their own communities as much to get to the ideology.
III. SYRIA
A. Christian Communities in Syria
Although they do not share the notoriety of their Lebanese
neighbors, Christian communities in Syria are just as historically based.
There are several Christian groups in Syria, although most literature lumps
them together as "Christians." '172 It is estimated that 10% of Syrians areS. 173
Christians of some variety. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch for Antioch
and All The East sits in Syria, and many religious and charitable works are
114carried out through the auspices of the Patriarchate. There are several
172. See Background Note: Syria, U.S. Department of State, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
Background Note: Syria].
173. See SYRIA, CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: SYRIA, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sy.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006)
[hereinafter SYRIA FAcTBOOK].
174. See Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East, Encyclopaedia
Brittanica Online, available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9037927 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2006); Historical Overview, Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All The
East, available at
http://antiochpat.org/english/sitefiles/viewcontent.php?content= %241 %24Fqww8OsV%24L
Jtl/mplsne5lzOmZ5kCyO_%241 %24cY2fEC.3 %242X4rjsf3DqljEbC53bz6R/_% 241%24Fq
ww80sV%24[Jtl/mplsne5lzOmZ5kCyOb56a92baa0ee987eb7f7e4al79b6Oefb&id=l&cat=%
241%24DdKoSQCb%24FO96gT8jCFwnHPxW4LNZj1_%241%24pCxQHS8F%24GHaB
WOfpsqpxYoSn4BEOM/_%241%24DdKoSQCb%24FO96gT8jCFwnHPxW4LNZj151O2e
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Uniate churches in Syria, principally Syriac Catholicism, the Melkite
Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, the Copts, the Maronites, as well
as Roman Catholicism itself. 5 One of the often unheard of side effects of
the current Iraqi political situation is that the Christian Assyrians (or
ChaldoAssyrians), a group which has in recent years come to rely on the
Kurds for support and protection, are now being removed from their
traditional areas by the Kurds and are fleeing to neighboring countries,
including Syria."'
B. Syrian Independence and History
The Syrian Arab Republic was established as an independent entity
in 1946, and has remained such until the present day, with a slight
interruption in independence occurring during the ill-fated attempt at
Egyptian and Syrian unity, the United Arab Republic. Its constitution
was not promulgated until 1973.179 The religious composition of Syria at its
founding did not mirror the levels of equality experienced in Lebanon; the
majority of the population was Muslim, with Sunnis being the dominant
sect.80
During the early part of Syria's existence, there was political
instability and infighting among groups vying for governmental primacy;
however, political dominance started to coalesce in the 1960s and 1970s
with the creation and rise to prominence of the Ba'ath party.81 Though
widely viewed today through the lens of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist state
124822220aaa78a8e3b2ccba34&catid=3&contentname=Historical %200verview&catname=
Other%20Contents (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
175. See Gemayel, supra note 34 (detailing the many Christian communities which exist in
both Syria and Lebanon).
176. See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF
THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM evll8-evll9 (2004), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2004O5/cmselect/cmfaff/109/109.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2006) ("There are currently only about 800,000 to one million
ChaldoAssyrians left in Iraq. Tens of thousands of them fled to neighbouring countries
such as Jordan and Syria after lethal and co-ordinated church bombings by Islamic
extremists killed at least 12 people and injured many more in August 2004.") Id. at evll8;
Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2004, Committee on International
Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Paul Marshall, Senior Fellow, Center for
Religious Freedom, Freedom House).
177. Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. EYAL ZISSER, ASAD'S LEGACY: SYRIA IN TRANSITION 5 (2001) [hereinafter ZISSER
SYRIA].
181. Id. at 6-8; Khuri, supra note 20, at 49.
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in Iraq, and the Assad state in Syria, it is interesting to note that one of the
fathers of Ba'athism was himself a Greek Orthodox, who established the
party as a way to promote pan-Arab unity.182 The intent of the Ba'ath
party was initially secular, with the unifying element being a shared Arab
183
ethnicity rather than religion.
At the same time that Ba'athism was coming to prominence in
Syria, so too were the Muslim minority Alawis, who were easily
outnumbered by Sunnis.1 84 Alawi leaders began infuse themselves in the
Ba'ath party, as well as governmental and military apparatuses, and
ultimately were able consolidate power and take control of Syria under
Hafiz al-Assad. From 1970 until his death in 2000, Hafiz al-Assad ruled
Syria under the guise of being the elected President and Ba'ath party
leader.1 86 In the wake of Hafiz al-Assad's death, his second son, Bashar al-
Assad, was elected President of Syria in a move which required a
constitutional amendment lowering the age of eligibility for the office of
187President. Despite his stated desire to bring Syria into the modem
world, 88 Bashar al-Assad's presidency has thus far been known for its ties
189to many terrorist groups, political repression following a brief period of
opening,' 9° and most recently, its role in the assassination of former
182. See ZISSER SYRIA, supra note 180, at 5.
183. See RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH, SYRIA: REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE 20 (2001)
(describing the early involvement of Christians - particularly Greek Orthodox, in the
Ba'athist movement); ZISSER SYRIA, supra note 180, at 26-27.
184. Id. at 48-49, 69-72.
185. Id. at 67-69.
186. See Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.
187. Id.
188. See FLYNT LAWRENCE LEVERETT, INHERITING SYRIA: BASHAR'S TRIAL BY FIRE 100
(2005).
(describing the statements made during Bashar al-Assad's 2000 presidential inaugural
address to Syria).
189. See LEBANON: WHO MURDERED HARIRI? INDEPENDENT PANEL PROBES Ex-
PREMIER'S ASSASSINATION, UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTER, available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=110&Body=Leban&Bodyl= (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006); see also Anthony Shadid, Syria Feels Heat Over U.N. Report,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 2005 available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/21/AR2005102100808.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
190. See Background Note: Syria, supra note 172; STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS:
SYRIA, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN
THE ARAB REGION, available at http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=19 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2006); LEVERETr, supra note 188, at 88-95.
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Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri - the increasingly anti-Syrian figure
discussed in Part II of this article. 91
In terms of Lebanese relations, Syria has considered Lebanon to be
• 192
a rightful part of its territory since its founding, and has not shied away
from saying that its separation from Lebanon is essentially illegal.'
Indeed, the language of the Syrian Constitution preamble clearly reflects
both this belief and the Ba'athist belief that the partition of the Middle
East was illegal. 94 Syrian claims to rights over the domestic situation in
Lebanon only increased with the power of Israel, and often Syria and
Israel have used Lebanon as a battleground in their own disputes.9 The
Lebanese civil war provided a ripe situation for Syrian intervention, and
throughout the decades of war the Syrian regime did just that, although it
intervened for different sides at different times, and was no more averse to
providing support to Christian fighters than to Hizbollah during the course
of the conflict. 96
The years of ceasefire in Lebanon have not seen a relaxing of Syrian
control.197 There is perhaps no better evidence of this than the Hariri
incident, which has raised the specter of Syrian secret police control over
Lebanon and its political actors to an international frenzy. 9 No longer the
elephant in the room of Middle Eastern diplomacy, the Hariri
assassination, and the public outcry and investigation which followed, has
brought Syrian tactics to the forefront of world politics. In a global
atmosphere which widely regards Syria as implicated in nefarious forms of
191. See discussion supra Part II. It is perhaps not surprising that Bashar al-Assad has
been at least inadvertently linked to Syrian operations in Lebanon, as before ascending to
the presidency he was given control of the "Lebanon file," Syria's terminology for the
oversight of Syrian operations in Lebanon. See LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 100.
192. See ZISSER SYRIA, supra note 180, at 129-32; LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 3-4.
193. See LEVERETI', supra note 188, at 3-4 (describing the Syrian view that Lebanon, as
well as Jordan, was artificially created by the West and should be territorially part of Syria).
194. See SYRIA [Constitution] pmbl., available at
http://www.mideastinfo.com/documents/Syria-Constitution.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
195. See discussion supra Part II; HINNEBUSCH, supra note 183, at 155-56.
196. See HINNEBUSCH, supra note 183, at 155-56 (describing the Syrian aims in switching
alliances during the civil war as framed against the Israeli/Syrian situation); ZISSER SYRIA,
supra note 180, at 133-36.
197. A year after the Ta'if Agreement was formalized, Syria and a war-weakened
Lebanon entered into the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, which
sought to tacitly legitimize the presence of Syria in Lebanon after the conclusion of the war.
See ZISSER SYRIA, supra note 180, at 129-30.
198. See discussion supra Part II; see also Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; see
also Tim Lister, Syrian Lawmakers Lambaste Ex-VP, Dec. 31, 2005, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/12/31/syria.reax.
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financing and terrorism, this controversy has created a weakened position
for the current Syrian regime.
C. Syrian Constitutional and Statutory Law
1. Constitutional Law
The current provisions of the Syrian Constitution were enacted in
1973.199 Much of the constitutional preamble deals with Ba'athist goals and
beliefs, enshrining pan-Arabism as the preeminent constitutional and
political principle in Syria.200 Theoretically, Syria "is a democratic,
,,201 202popular, socialist, and sovereign state, to be run as a republic.
Further, Islam is declared the primary provider of Syrian legislation,2° and
although a state religion is not provided for in the constitution, "[t]he
religion of the President of the Republic has to be Islam. ' '20 4 At the same
time, the constitution also provides that "[t]he freedom of faith is
guaranteed. The state respects all religions"' 20 5 and "[t]he state guarantees
the freedom to hold any religious rites, provided they do not disturb the
public order., 20 6  Thus, religious rights are both protected and
circumscribed by a subjective constitutional standard.
Much of the Syrian Constitution reflects the strong affiliation which
existed between Syria and communist countries prior to the collapse of the
U.S.S.R.20 7 The role of socialism in framing the Syrian legal system is
particularly evident in the constitutional provisions regarding categories of
allowed ownership,208 and the rights of owners of real and personal
property in their belongings;209 the right of the state to appropriate
210personal funds and belongings is also set out in the constitution.
Interestingly, the Syrian Constitution's plain meaning expresses a
respect for the individual in criminal matters and specifically states that
"[n]o one may be tortured physically or mentally or be treated in a
199. See Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.
200. See SYRIA [Constitution], supra note 194, at pmbl.
201. Id. at ch. 1, pt. 1, art. 1.
202. Id. at art. 2.
203. Id. at art. 3.
204. Id.
205. Id. at art. 35.
206. See SYRIA [Constitution], supra note 194, at ch. 1, pt. 1, art. 35.
207. See generally LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 54-55.
208. See SYRIA [Constitution], supra note 194, at ch. 1, pt. 2, arts. 14, 16.
209. Id. at art. 15.
210. Id.
211. Id. at pt. 4, arts. 28, 29.
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humiliating manner., 212 These tenets are applied more stringently in word
than in practice under the Syrian regime according to official reports.213
Again highlighting the disconnect between constitutional jurisprudence
and practices of the Syrian regime, the constitution guarantees "[e]very
citizen has the right to freely and openly express his views in words, in
writing, and through all other means of expression .... The state
guarantees the freedom of the press, of printing, and publication in
accordance with the law., 21 4 The right to publicly gather and protest is also
guaranteed in the Syrian Constitution, tempered by the express proviso
that "[t]he law regulates the exercise of this right.,
215
Electoral districts are defined under Syrian constitutional law as
being formed by a set number of peasants and workers per area, and are
216
not drawn according to sectarian affiliations. Nominally, the People's
Assembly - the Syrian legislative branch - has wide-ranging constitutional217
powers; however, in reality the associates of the Assad regimes have
218
wielded these powers from within legislative and ministerial circles. The
constitution sets out many powers for the President as well,219 including a
place on the Syrian Supreme Court 2° and the High Council of the
221Judiciary.
2. Syrian Statutory Law
Constitutional protections aside, all Syrians are entitled to suffrage
222from age 18 onwards, as long as they are not members of the military or
223 224police forces, or immigrants to Syria. Despite these protections,
Syrians lack the ability to directly change their government at the federal
212. Id. at art. 28.
213. See generally Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.
214. SYRIA [Constitution], supra note 194, at ch. 1, pt. 4, art. 38.
215. Id. at art. 39.
216. Id. at ch. 2, pt. 1, art. 53.
217. See id. at ch. 2 pt. 1.; United Nations Development Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab Region Legislature: Syria, available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/legislature.asp?cid=19 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
218. See Background Note: Syria, supra note 172.
219. See SYRIA [Constitution], supra note 194, at ch. 2, pt. 2.
220. Id. at ch. 3, pt. 2, art. 139.
221. Id. at pt. 1, art. 132.
222. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN
THE ARAB REGION, ELECTIONS: SYRIA, available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/elections.asp?cid=19 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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level under the electoral law, and have open electoral options at the most
basic levels of political elections.225
In terms of personal status, Syrian law recognizes the same set of
religious courts for determining status-based questions as does Lebanese
226law. These courts fit into a judicial structure in Syria which is heavily
227linked to the regime at the helm.
The constitution is essentially ineffective in the face of emergency
laws which have been in effect for decades in Syria;228 these rules include
the applicability of marital law to the general population, especially
political protesters and dissidents.229 Additionally, the emergency laws are
routinely used in Syria to control the media and its messages. 23 During an
attempted reformation of Syria's laws in 2005, the Assad government
promulgated rules purporting to require that the prosecutorial body
holding prisoners state a reason for the detention within five days of the
231
onset of the detention. Importantly, however, security and terrorism
232
related crimes do not fall under the terms of these legal changes.
None of these laws are directed at religious groups in particular, as
the focus of the state is the control of the population as a whole, especially
given the status of the ruling Alawi elite as a minority religion within the
Syrian Muslim population. The state apparatus has made itself into an all-
encompassing bureaucracy in order to subjugate the religious and class
differences that existed from the time of Syrian independence onwards,
and has at least facially completed part of its task.33
225. Id. The election laws for local elections were drastically amended in April, 2005 to
allow for greater electoral freedom for positions lesser than those of the governor.
226. Judiciary: Syria, United Nations Development Programme, Programme on
Governance in the Arab Region, available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/judiciary.asp?cid=19 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
227. Id.
228. State-Civil Society Relations: Syria, United Nations Development Programme,
Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=19 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See HINNEBUSCH, supra note 183, at 84-85 (describing the role of the state
bureaucracy in Syrian society); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Class and State in Ba'athist Syria
in SYRIA: SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND POLICY (Richard T. Antoun and Donald Quataert eds.,
1991) (describing the educational apparatus established under the Assad regime);
LEVERETT, supra note 188, at 24-25.
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D. Possibilities for the future
The strength of the Christian communities in Syria is difficult to
assess because of the lack of information available, however it is clear that
there are such communities involved in active worship and religious
works. 234 It is also clear that the forced migration of Assyrians from Iraq to
Syria is an evolving situation 23 which, over time, could result in a political
issue for the Syrian regime, as well as Syrian Christian leaders.
While tensions might not be overtly brewing within Syrian Christian
communities, the increasing international scrutiny on the Assad
government could lead to greater disturbances in the social and political
order in Syria. This in turn could cause sectarianism to come to the
forefront of Syrian politics, causing problems in Muslim and Christian
communities. Given these considerations, it is important to note that
analysts and United States lawmakers have steadily increased their stated
beliefs that Syria has been and continues to be a source of support for236 237
terrorist groups 6, their financiers and arms providers, as well as a place
238of severe political repression, and a state involved in repeated incursions
into the sovereignty of Lebanon.23' The Hariri controversy may be the
234. In addition to the existence of churches and Christian religious organizations in
Syria, perhaps the best measure of the presence and vivacity of Christian communities in
Syria is that 10% of the population does identify itself as Christian.
235. See supra note 176 at ev 118.
236. See LEVERETr, supra note 188, at 10 (stating that Syria was first placed on the
United States' state-sponsored terrorism watch list in 1979; it has not been removed since);
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
175 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2004)).
237. See LEVERETr, supra note 188, at 12;Associated Press, Iraqis Nab Alleged Top
Terror Financier, Oct. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendlystory/0,3566,172810,00.html (stating that a senior
financier for the Iraq insurgents was apprehended in Iraq after Syria forced him to leave
the country); Associated Press, IRS Docs Detail Ties Between Syria, Iraq, Jul. 27, 2005,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/,3566,163721,00.html;
Financing of the Iraqi Insurgency, Joint Hearing of the Terrorism, Unconventional threats
and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee and the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee, Federal News
Service, Jul. 28, 2005 (statement of Rep. Sue Kelly); Terror Financing in the Middle East,
Senate Banking, House and Urban Affairs Committee, Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony, Jul. 13, 2005 (statement of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant
Secretary, U.S. Dept. of State).
238. See 151 CONG. REC. H. 3163, 109th Cong. (daily ed., May 11, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Ros-Lehtinen); H. Con. Res. 18, 109th Cong. (2005) ("Expressing Concern Regarding
Violation of Human Rights by Syria.").
239. See Background Note: Lebanon, supra note 14; H. Con. Res. 32, 109th Cong. (2005)
("Expressing the grave concern of Congress regarding the occupation of the Republic of
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most visible chapter in this escalation of international hostilities with the
Syrian regime. However, the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, enacted by Congress and signed into
240law by the President, is an indication that skepticism about the propriety
of the Syrian position in Lebanon existed before the death of Hariri and
will continue even after the conclusion of the investigation into his
assassination.
In this context, Syrian Christian communities stand in a position to
influence their status and the future of Syria by taking action to undermine
the Assad regime, at the most extreme, or at least to enforce their
constitutional rights and force the abrogation of emergency and statutory
laws that serve only to abridge the rights guaranteed to all Syrians under
the constitution. Certainly, there is risk involved in this course of action,
and perhaps the best way to encourage this type of agitation is through
members of the Syrian diaspora living abroad, as well as funding and
legislative actions by the United States and its allies to assist these
communities. By creating a shared identity outside of the state apparatus,
Syrian Christians would create a way to circumvent repressive politics
while acting confidently in their constitutional rights and privileges. With
adequate support, this could prompt regime changes which would open
society for all Syrians and stop Syrian incursions into Lebanon, thus
further raising the international prestige of Syria as a whole and promoting
greater regional stability.
In this context, Lebanese and Syrian Christian communities would
do best to work in tandem to promote their agendas within the legal
frameworks which protect them in their respective countries. The current
disconnect between the provisions of the Lebanese and Syrian
constitutions and their respective statutory laws is not insurmountable,
especially as constitutions tend to engender a more exalted status in
society than do legislatively promulgated laws, which can be more easily
done away with.
Lebanon by the Syrian Arab Republic"; this bill was introduced nearly a month before the
Hariri assassination); H.R. 1141, 109th Cong. (2005) (introducing the "Lebanon and Syria
Liberation Act").
240. Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-175 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2004)).
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IV. CONCLUSION'
This article has discussed the Christian communities in Lebanon and
Syria, as well as the legal protections guaranteed for citizens of Lebanon
and Syria under their respective constitutional and statutory laws.
Emphasis has been placed on certain aspects of legal life in both countries,
as the author believes that these areas are key testing grounds for the
connection between constitutional protections and everyday life - and in
this test both countries fail. Brief historical sketches have been offered in
order to provide a background for the religious and legal discussions of the
article, and also to illustrate why Christian communities in these countries
would function best when they function as a co-religionist block rather
than within the framework of their own sects.
Admittedly, the courses of action advocated in this article would
require all communities to put away sectarian interests, which is much
more easily advocated than achieved in reality. However, the reality of the
current political situation in the Middle East, and international relations as
a whole is changing to the point where alliances with groups which share at
least some communal interests are becoming more necessary than in the
post-World War II era of self-determination and group segregation for
statehood purposes. Both legally and politically, now is the time for
Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria to come together to help
reshape their states in ways which previous conflicts have not allowed.
The story of Babel, reflected in modern Christian community conflicts
such as that experienced in Lebanon, is a constant reminder of what
happens when societies divide over a common aim; it is hoped that a
bringing together of Christian communities may take them from the ruin
of collapse and failure to a path towards a state which embraces its
enunciated respect for religious freedom.
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